Thomas Nadelhoffer
Assistant Professor
Phone: 843.953.3012
E-mail: nadelhofferta@cofc.edu
Personal Website: http://agencyandresponsibility.typepad.com/thomas_nadelhoffer/
Greetings! My name is Thomas Nadelhoffer. I was born and raised in Atlanta, Georgia. I went on to earn degrees in philosophy from The University of Georgia (BA), Georgia State University (MA), and Florida State University (PhD). From 2006 until 2012, I was an assistant professor of philosophy and a member of the law and policy faculty at Dickinson College in Carlisle, Pennsylvania. During this time, I also spent a year at The SAGE Center for the Study of the Mind (U.C. Santa Barbara) as a post-doctoral fellow with the MacArthur Law and Neuroscience Project, and I spent a second year at The Kenan Institute for Ethics (Duke University) finishing out the two-year post-doc (2009-2011). I am very excited to begin my new job as an assistant professor of philosophy at the College of Charleston this fall (2012).
Education
Ph.D. in Philosophy Florida State University (2002-2005)
M.A. in Philosophy Georgia State University (1996-1999)
B.A. in Philosophy University of Georgia (1992-1996)
Research Interests
My main areas of research include moral psychology, free will, punishment theory, and neurolaw. Lately, I have been especially interested in the relevance of the gathering data on psychopathy to the philosophy of punishment, and the potential promise and perils of using neuroscience to make better predictions of future dangerousness for the purposes of the law. My articles have appeared in journals such as Analysis, Midwest Studies in Philosophy, Mind & Language, Neuroethics, and Philosophy and Phenomenological Research. Moreover, I recently edited Moral Psychology: Historical and Contemporary Readings with Eddy Nahmias and Shaun Nichols, and I am presently editing The Future of Punishment (Oxford University Press)--which includes contributions from Derk Pereboom, John Martin Fischer, Al Mele, Michael Corrado, Stephen Morse, Shaun Nichols, and others.
Since 2011, I have also been working on a two-year project with philosopher Eddy Nahmias and psychologists Jonathan Schooler and Kathleen Vohs that is entitled, "The Psychology of Free Will." Our project is part of The John Templeton Foundation's Big Questions in Free Will grant that is being administered by Alfred Mele. We will be working not only to develop a new scale for measuring folk intuitions and attitudes about free will, dualism, determinism, and responsibility, but we will also be running several studies that explore how these intuitions and attitudes (or lack thereof) get expressed behaviorally. One of our central goals is to examine how future advances in neuroscience might influence our moral and legal beliefs and practices.
Honors and Awards
GRANTS
1. The Templeton Foundation Big Questions in Free Will Project: “The Psychology of Free Will,” with Eddy Nahmias, Jonathan Schooler, and Kathleen Vohs, $295,000 (2011-2013)
2. The MacArthur Foundation Law and Neuroscience Project: “The Responsibility, Agency, and Determinism Scale,” $7,000 (2010-2011)
3. The MacArthur Foundation Law and Neuroscience Project: “Neuroprediction and Blame,” with Dena Gromet, $9,000 (2009-2011)
4. The Andrew Mellon Foundation: Faculty Development Grant, Dickinson College, $2,000 (Fall 2009)
Publications
EDITED VOLUMES
1. Nadelhoffer, T. (forthcoming). The Future of Punishment. Oxford University Press.
2. Nadelhoffer, T., Nahmias, E., & Nichols, S. (2010). Moral Psychology: Classical and Contemporary Readings. Wiley-Blackwell.
JOURNAL ARTICLES
1. Nadelhoffer, T., Heshmati, S., Kaplan, D., & Nichols, S. (forthcoming) “Folk Retributivism: In Theory and Action.” Economics and Philosophy.
2. Nadelhoffer, T., & Sinnott-Armstrong, W. (forthcoming). “Neurolaw and Neuroprediction: Potential Promises and Perils.” Philosophy Compass.
3. Nadelhoffer, T. (forthcoming). “Attempts in Ordinary Language and the Criminal Law.” Jurisprudence.
4. Nadelhoffer, T., & Nahmias, E. (forthcoming). “Free Will, Neuroscience, and the Criminal Law.” Thurgood Marshall Law Review.
5. Nadelhoffer, T., Bibas, S., Grafton, S., Kiehl, K., Mansfield, A., Sinnott-Armstrong, W., & Gazzaniga, M. (2012). “Neuroprediction, Violence, and the Law: Setting the Stage.” Neuroethics, 5: 67-99.
6. Nadelhoffer, T. (2011). “Neural Lie Detection, Criterial Change, and Ordinary Language.” Neuroethics 4(3): 205-213.
7. Nadelhoffer, T., & Matveeva, T. (2009). “Positive Illusions, Perceived Control, and the Free Will Debate.” Mind & Language, 24: 495-522.
8. Feltz, A., Cokely, E., & Nadelhoffer, T. (2009). “Natural Compatibilism vs. Natural Incompatibilism: Back to the Drawing Board.” Mind & Language, 24: 1-23.
9. Nadelhoffer, T., Kvaran, T., & Nahmias, E. (2009). “Temperament and Intuition: A Commentary on Feltz and Cokely.” Consciousness and Cognition 18: 351-355.
10.Nadelhoffer, T., & Feltz, A. (2008). “The Actor-Observer Bias and Moral Intuitions: Adding Fuel to Sinnott-Armstrong’s Fire.” Neuroethics 1(2): 133-144.
11. Nadelhoffer, T., & Nahmias, E. (2008). “Polling as a Valuable Pedagogical Tool for Teaching Philosophy.” Teaching Philosophy 30(1): 39-58.
12. Nadelhoffer, T., & Nahmias, E. (2007). “The Past and Future of Experimental Philosophy.” Philosophical Explorations 10(2): 123-149.
13.Nadelhoffer, T., & Feltz, A.(2007). “Folk Intuitions, Slippery Slopes, and Necessary Fictions: An Essay on Smilansky’s Free Will Illusionism.” Midwest Studies in Philosophy 13(1): 202-213.
14. Nadelhoffer, T. (2007). “Fringe Benefits, Side Effects, and Intentional Actions: A Reply to Feltz.” The Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Psychology 27(1): 801-809.
15. Nadelhoffer, T. (2006). “On Trying to Save the Simple View.” Mind & Language 21(5): 565-586.
16. Nahmias, E., Morris, S., Nadelhoffer, T., & Turner, J. (2006). “Is Incompatibilism Intuitive?” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 73(1): 28-53. Reprinted in J. Knobe and S. Nichols (eds.), Experimental Philosophy (Oxford University Press).
17. Nadelhoffer, T. (2006). “Bad Acts, Blameworthy Agents, and Intentional Actions: Some Problems for Jury Impartiality.” Philosophical Explorations 9(2): 203-220. Reprinted in J. Knobe and S. Nichols (eds.), Experimental Philosophy (New York: Oxford University Press).
18. Nadelhoffer, T. (2006). “Foresight, Moral Considerations, and Intentional Actions.” The Journal of Cognition and Culture 6(1): 133-158.
19.Nahmias, E., Morris, S., Nadelhoffer, T., & Turner, J. (2005).“Surveying Free Will: Folk Intuitions about Free Will and Moral Responsibility.” Philosophical Psychology 18(5): 561-584.
20. Nadelhoffer, T. (2005). “Skill, Luck, and Action.” Philosophical Psychology 18(3): 343-354.
21. Nahmias, E., Morris, S., Nadelhoffer, T., & Turner, J. (2004). “The Phenomenology of Free Will.” The Journal of Consciousness Studies 11: 162-179.
22. Nadelhoffer, T. (2004). “Blame, Badness, and Intentional Action: A Reply to Knobe and Mendlow.” The Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Psychology 24: 259-269.
23. Nadelhoffer, T. (2004). “On Implicit Testability and Philosophical Explanations.” Philosophical Writings No. 27: 3-14.
24. Nadelhoffer, T. (2004). “Praise, Side Effects, and Intentional Action.” The Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Psychology 24: 196-213.
25. Nadelhoffer, T. (2004). “The Butler Problem Revisited.” Analysis 64(3): 277-284.
BOOK CHAPTERS
1. Nadelhoffer, T. (forthcoming). “Mechanistic Minds, Free Will, and the Law.” In D. Patterson (Ed.), Law and Neuroscience. Oxford University Press.
2. Nadelhoffer, T. (forthcoming). “Omnivorism and the Moral Burden of Proof.” In B. Bramble & R. Fischer (Eds.), Stirring the Pot: New Essays for Omnivores. Oxford University Press.
3. Nadelhoffer, T. “Folk Dualism and the Threat of Shrinking Agency.” In W. Sinnott-Armstrong (Ed.), Moral Psychology: Neuroscience, Free Will, and Responsibility (Vol.4). MIT Press.
4. Nadelhoffer, T., & Sinnott-Armstrong, W. (forthcoming). “Is Psychopathy a Mental Disease?” In N. Vincent (Ed.), Legal Responsibility and Neuroscience. Oxford University Press.
5. Nadelhoffer, T., Gromet, D., Goodwin, G., Nahmias, E., Sripada, C., & Sinnott-Armstrong, W. (forthcoming).“The Mind, the Brain, and the Criminal Law.” In T. Nadelhoffer (Ed.), The Future of Punishment. Oxford University Press.
6. Nadelhoffer, T. (2011). “Criminal Law, Philosophy, and Psychology: Working at the Cross-roads.” In L. Green and B. Leiter (Eds.), The Oxford Studies in the Philosophy of Law. Oxford University Press: 267-289.
7. Nadelhoffer, T. (2011). “The Threat of Shrinking Agency and Free Will Disillusionism.” In L. Nadel and W. Sinnott-Armstrong (Eds.), Conscious Will and Responsibility. Oxford University Press: 173-188.
8. Nadelhoffer, T., & Sinnott-Armstrong, W. (2011). “Experimental Ethics.” In C. Miller (Ed.) Continuum Companion to Ethics. Continuum: 261-274. (=)
9. Nadelhoffer, T. (2011). “Experimental Philosophy of Action.” In J. Aguilar, A. Buckareff, & K. Frankish (Eds.), New Waves in the Philosophy of Action. Palgrave-MacMillan: 50-78.
10. Nadelhoffer, T. (2011). “Neuroscience, Violence, and the Law.” In M. Herzog-Evans (Ed.), Transnational Criminology Manual (Vol. 2). Hart Publishing: 507-523.
11. Nadelhoffer, T. (2010). “The Causal Theory of Action and the Still Puzzling Knobe Effect.” In J. Aguilar, A. Buckareff, & K. Frankish (Eds.),The Causal Theory of Action. MIT University Press (2010): 277-298.
