Conferences and Lectures
Sabbatical Lecture: Visible Hands: Virtue Ethics & Market Behavior
Dr. Jennifer Baker
Associate Professor of Philosophy, College of Charleston
Tuesday, April 16th, 2013
3:15 pm, Levin Library - Room 209 Yaschik Jewish Studies Center (96 Wentworth)
"Every consciousness upon whatever object it is primarily directed, is constantly directed upon itself," wrote Franz Brentano in 1874 in his seminal work, Psychology From an Empirical Standpoint. This assertion of the unity of consciousness as reflexive awareness, which finds its roots in Aristotle, has been both criticized and vigorously defended by contemporary philosophers working in the interdisciplinary field of Consciousness Studies. In this presentation, I first consider various alternatives to the reflexivist theory of consciousness, specifically higher-order, representationalist, token-physicalist, and dualist theories. I then review evidence from embodied cognitive science that highlights various problems these latter theories face in accounting for the character of consciousness. Finally, I entertain the question whether this sort of evidence provides sufficient ground for claiming that something like a pre-reflective self-awareness is prior to the types of consciousness that presuppose conceptual and narrative competence.
Moral Pluralism
Dr. Michael Gill
Associate Professor of Philosophy, University of Arizona
Thursday, April 11th, 2013
6:30 pm, Alumni Memorial Hall of Randolph Hall
There are two ways of viewing morality: the monistic and the pluralist. Monists believe that all of morality is based on a single ultimate value, and that all cases of moral conflict can be resolved by determining what that one ultimate value demands. Pluralists, in contrast, believe that there are a number of different ultimate moral values, and that as a result we may sometimes face conflicting moral demands that cannot be completely resolved. We’ll discuss some of the most powerful reasons to believe that pluralism is right by looking at the views of David Hume, Adam Smith, and contemporary moral psychologists. We’ll also examine the implications moral pluralism can have for conflicts between the general welfare and individual property rights.
This is the second of two lectures sponsored by the Coastal Conservation League and we are grateful for their support!
What Nāgārjuna Really Has at Stake in Refuting Motion: Thoughts on Action as a Person-level Phenomenon
Dan Arnold
Divinity School
University of Chicago
The 2nd century South Asian philosopher Nāgārjuna is considered the founder of the Madhyamaka or "Middle Way" school of thought. In his magnum opus, Stanzas of the Middle Way, Nāgārjuna addresses issues similar to those that concern Western philosophers like Sextus Empiricus, Hume, and Wittgenstein. Specifically, Nāgārjuna offers an analysis of phenomena or processes that appear to exist independently but that, he claims, cannot so exist. These phenomena, though lacking inherent existence, are not, however, nonexistent. Rather, they are taken to be only conventionally real. Dan Arnold will consider one such skeptical argument, the argument against motion, as concerning essentially the issue of whether a personal level of description can admit of an exhaustively impersonal explanation.
Thursday, March 21, 2013 at 3:15 p.m. in Addlestone Library, Room 227
Personhood, Ethics, & Animal Cognition
Gary Varner
Professor of Philosophy
Texax A & M University
This talk introduces various conceptions of personhood, including the idea that a person is one who has a biographical sense of self and a robust, conscious sense of his or her own past and future. It examines recent empirical research related to deciding the question of which non-human animals, if any, qualify as persons or at least near-persons. The talk concludes by exploring possible implications of these ideas for various human uses of animals, including for food.
Professor Varner is Head of the Philosophy Department at Texas A&M University and specializes in environmental and animal ethics, utilitarianism, and environmental law.
Thursday, March 14, 2013 at 3:15 p.m. in Addlestone Library, Room 227
Philosophy Department Faculty Panel: Narrative, Ethics, and The Lives of Animals
Roundtable discussion with Jonathan Neufeld (Philosophy), Simon Lewis (English), and Ornaith O'Dowd (Philosophy)
In 1997, J. M. Coetzee's delivered the Tanner Lectures on Human Values that would become his novella The Lives of Animals. Typically, the Tanner lectures are philosophical essays presenting arguments on specific ethical or political problems or concepts. Instead of presenting the usual set of arguments, Coetzee delivered two lectures that were two chapters from a novella. The novella's central character, Elizabeth Costello, herself delivers two lectures on humans' mistreatment animals (to put it mildly). While she presents arguments and counterarguments, as do other characters in the story, these arguments do not simply stand as arguments—they are also, of course, literary devices that constitute the book as the work of art that it is. Is Coetzee really just making an argument, and just adding color to it with the story? Or does the fact that it is a piece of literature change the status of the arguments in it? Why might we make certain kinds of ethical claims in artistic form rather than in some other form (the form of philosophical argument typically found in the Tanner Lectures, for example)? Is there something about talking about the lives of animals, in particular, that calls for a literary, rather than a philosophical response?
Thursday, February 14, 2012 at 12:15 p.m. in the Alumni Center, School of Education, Health, & Human Performance
Sabbatical Lecture: The Enchantment of Consciousness
Dr. Christian Coseru
Associate Professor of Philosophy, College of Charleston
Tuesday, February 12th, 2013
3:15 pm, Tate Center, Room 202
"Every consciousness upon whatever object it is primarily directed, is constantly directed upon itself," wrote Franz Brentano in 1874 in his seminal work, Psychology From an Empirical Standpoint. This assertion of the unity of consciousness as reflexive awareness, which finds its roots in Aristotle, has been both criticized and vigorously defended by contemporary philosophers working in the interdisciplinary field of Consciousness Studies. In this presentation, I first consider various alternatives to the reflexivist theory of consciousness, specifically higher-order, representationalist, token-physicalist, and dualist theories. I then review evidence from embodied cognitive science that highlights various problems these latter theories face in accounting for the character of consciousness. Finally, I entertain the question whether this sort of evidence provides sufficient ground for claiming that something like a pre-reflective self-awareness is prior to the types of consciousness that presuppose conceptual and narrative competence.
Philosophy Colloquium Series: Justification Without Normativity
Adventures in Rationalism
Dr. Michael Della Rocca
Andrew Downey Orrick Professor of Philosophy, Yale University
Monday, November 12th, 2012
6:30 pm, Alumni Memorial Hall of Randolph Hall
The Principle of Sufficient Reason (the PSR) which rejects brute facts has a venerable history but has also fallen out of favor. This is due, no doubt, to the exotic nature of the PSR's implications, especially monism which in one of its forms is the thesis that there is only one thing. Despite this hostile environment, the paper ventures to offer a defense of the PSR and concludes on a surprising note.
This is the first of two lectures sponsored by the Coastal Carolina Conservation League and we are grateful for their support!
Philosophy Colloquium Series: Believing in Free Will: A Philosophical / Psychological Investigation
Dr. Thomas Nadelhoffer
Assistant Professor of Philosophy, College of Charleston
Thursday, November 8th, 2012
3:15 pm, ECTR 113
Recently, psychologists and experimental philosophers have become increasingly interested in people’s intuitions about free will. However, the goal of this empirical research is not to explore whether humans actually have free will, metaphysically speaking; rather, the goal is to explore the instrumental value of believing in free will. After all, regardless of whether we have free will, believing that we do could nevertheless be interpersonally and intrapersonally beneficial. During this talk, I will situate my own research on this front within the broader project of trying to understand how people think about free will. I will also argue that my latest findings suggest that there may be a dark side to believing in free will--which is an issue that calls out for further investigation.
Philosophy Department-Sponsored Lecture: "Covers as Social Commentary: Dylan, The Monkees, & Tiffany"
Please join the First-Year Experience, the Department of Philosophy and the Music Departments at a lecture, "Covers as Social Commentary: Dylan, The Monkees, and Tiffany" by Theodore Gracyk. A reception sponsored by the Philosophy Society will follow. Theodore Gracyk is a philosopher of music and culture at Minnesota State University, Moorhead, author of several books including Rhythm and Noise: An Aesthetics of Rock (1996); I Wanna Be Me: Rock Music and the Politics of Identity (2001); Listening to Popular Music (2007); and On Music (forthcoming).
Friday, November 2nd, 2012
3:15 pm - 4:45 pm
Tate 202
